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RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE
ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN WAR
THOMAS BENJAMIN

THE ORIGINS of the United States war with Mexico continue to
interest students of American and Mexican history, in large part
because it is a subject as controversial and perplexing today as it
was for Democrats and Whigs in the spring of 1846. The recent
literature on the Mexican War is not as abundant as it is in certain
other areas, such as the Mexican Revolution, where there is disagreement among historians. The quality of recent Mexican War
scholarship, however, far outweighs its numerical inferiority. The
recent scholarship, in fact, has substantially improved the character of the traditional historiography.l
Traditional historiographical divisions still persist, although recent interpretations are less rigidly defined and are more
sophisticated and complex. Mexican scholars have begun to move
from their nationalistic and defensive interpretations to examinations of domestic causes of the war. The slave-power conspiracy
thesis which was used to explain expansionism in the Southwest as
a southern plot to add new slave states to the union, has largely
disappeared. The Whig thesis, which maintained that President
James K. Polk actively plotted his way to war, as well as the PolkDemocratic thesis which placed the burden of responsibility for
the war on Mexico, are alive and well in the recent historiography.
A final group of studies all but defy categorization. The authors of
these books grapple with the difficult issues to form new conclusions which are neither Whig nor Democratic, anti-Mexican nor
unabashedly pro-United States.
Unfortunately few recent studies have been written on the subject of the essential motivations that underlay expansionism on the
part of the United States in the 1840s; Beginning students of the
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Mexican War should first refer to Norman A. Graebner's examination of the commercial push for a Pacific coastline and Frederick
Merk's study of the crusading ideology of American expansionism,
Manifest Destiny. The best recent synthesis on the subject is
William Goetzmann's short monograph of the romantic impulse
for expansion. To Goetzmann "the motivation for American continental expansion was more complex than simple greed." It was a
compound of agrarian cupidity, mission, the desire for trade,
racial prejudice, and a basic sense of insecurity. 2
The intent of this article is to survey this recent historiography
on both sides of the border since the mid-1960s, reporting on continuing trends and new interpretations.
The early Whig interpretation of the causes of the war focused
on the ambitions, cunning, and partisanship of James K. Polk.
This theme of personality responsibility was from the beginning,
however, tied to the theme of a manipulative slavocracy seeking to
expand the territorial base of slavery. 3 Authors of the recent
studies of the Whig persuasion have stopped paying serious attention to the slavocracy conspiracy interpretation and squarely lay
responsibility for the war on President Polk. 4 The more critical
view which posits that Polk consciously plotted his way to war
was first seriously researched in the 1930s by Richard Stenberg. 5
Stenberg argues that Commodore Robert F. Stockton and several
other American citizens in the Republic of Texas were under
secret orders from Polk to persuade the Texan government to attack the Mexican forces along the Rio Grande so that the United
States could "annex a war" as well as the new state to the Union. a
Stenberg also maintains that Polk sought to incite Americans in
California to revolt against Mexican rule and then seek American
protection and annexation. 7
Glenn W. Price takes up the Stenberg thesis with new vigor and
research. S Price argues that when the Polk-Stockton war plan
failed, Polk was forced to use the Texas-Mexican boundary confusion to provoke war. The primary question and most difficult
problem of Price's book is not documenting what Stockton sought
to do in Texas, which is beyond dispute, but linking his activities
to Presidential authorization. Price is clearly aware of the difficulty this presents. He notes that the trail linking Stockton to Polk
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"was deliberately and carefully hidden."9 The fascinating problem posed by this book is that of who to believe and how to interpret the ambiguous primary sources.
Price, as had Stenberg thirty years earlier, relies heavily upon
Anson Jones's own account of Texan history (written five years
after the Stockton affair) and accepts it as valid. 1o Jones, the last
president of Texas, accused Polk of "inducing me to the responsibility of provoking and bringing [war with Mexico] about." I 1
Price fails to question Jones's intent in writing the book, his dislike
for Polk, and his opposition to annexation. It should also be
remembered that Jones's knowledge of Stockton's "Presidential
orders" came from Stockton himself, who very likely would have
invoked this higher authority for his mission whether or not it was
true. Price's thesis cannot be easily refuted and certainly should
not be ignored by serious students of the war. Indeed, students
must take a stand on this question, given its central implications
concerning Polk's ruthless ambition for Mexican territory, before
they tackle the more outstanding incidents such as the Slidell mission and General Taylor's march to the Rio Grande. 12
It is not surprising that the Mexican Left has found the Stenberg
interpretation congenial. Gaston Garcia Cantu relies on Glenn
Price for the actual coming of the war but he is more concerned
with the underlying motivation and meaning of North American
expansionismY To Garcia Cantu, North American expansionism
was an inevitable product of capitalism. President Polk completed
the expansionist dream of Thomas Jefferson and expressed the nationalist arguments for aggression at the decisive stage of
capitalist growth in the United States. 14 The war was necessary,
according to the author, for the continued growth of North
American capitalism and also for Mexican conservatives who
sought to preserve church domains and army privileges. In both
countries it was a war against the popular classes. IS
Gilberto L6pez y Rivas considers the war one of conquest, plain
and simple. 16 He is critical, however, of certain Mexican "internal
factors," specifically liberals who were enthusiastic about North
American institutions and who paved the way for United States
encroachment through commercial and colonization schemes. 17
John H. Schroeder's monograph of anti-government criticism in
the United States during the war does not bypass the tough issues
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of the war's originY Schroeder, like Lopez, argues that Polk's was
a militant policy. "While publicly committed to peaceful diplomacy," he contends, "Polk maneuvered to ensure war if necessary to
gain his objectives." Polk used the claims dispute with Mexico to
achieve his territorial objectives, whatever the COSt.1 9 Schroeder
concludes that the largely Whig, anti-war movement had little effect on the war. However, one must add that it has had considerable influence on the writing of the history of the war until
this day.
Generally, the proponents of the Whig interpretation see the
origins of the Mexican War as a one-sided affair. To them the
United States was entirely responsible for the war while Mexico
was a passive, if not willing, bystander. The Mexican role was that
of victim and, to these scholars, relatively unimportant.
The Democratic thesis originated in the documents the Polk administration sent to Congress upon the declaration of war in May,
1846. 20 Polk noted that the peaceful efforts to reestablish good
relations and adjust the border with Mexico "on liberal and
honorable terms" were rebuffed again and again. Finally, the
Mexican government, after menacing the territory of the United
States for months and unwilling to accept the lawful annexation of
Texas to the Union, invaded this country and "shed the blood of
our fellow citizens on our soil."21
The Democratic interpretation received its most thorough treatment by Justin Harvey Smith in 1919. 22 Smith conducted exhaustive research, using both North American and Mexican archives.
His two-volume work won the Pulitzer prize in 1920 and as late as
1964 was considered an indispensable account by the authors of
the most recent historiographical review of the war. 23 Smith's account of Mexican history and life from 1800 is insightful and interesting, although he denigrates the Mexican people. The purpose
of his early chapters is to note the anarchy within the early Mexican republic and to suggest that good relations between the two
countries were impossible because of internal Mexican problems.
Although the book has more than one thousand pages, Smith
devotes only one hundred pages to the origins of the war. He concentrates on the peaceful intent and efforts of the Polk administration. Smith also gives considerable attention to, as he views it, the
unrealistic, belligerent, and offensive claims and pronouncements
of the Mexican government, army, and press. In short, says Smith,
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"Polk told only the truth when he said the conflict was forced
upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico threatened it; Mexico issued
orders to wage it."24
Recent works of the Democratic conviction by Seymour Connor
and Odie B. Faulk, William H. Goetzmann, and Sanford H. Montaigne show these scholars to be the intellectual heirs to Smith's
study.25 Their accounts, neither collectively nor singularly,
replace or supplement to any noteworthy degree Smith's monograph. Conner and Faulk allot only thirty pages to the question of
war origins. They reject t~e claims question, boundary dispute,
and American desire for California as serious causes of the war. In
their analysis it was the annexation of Texas, a province long lost
to Mexico as "any realistic Mexican politician knew. . ."
which prompted the Mexican attack on the United States. 26 The
Connor and Faulk book is most valuable for its ninety-one page
analytical bibliography of the war which lists seven hundred and
sixty-six books and pamphlets. To be of most use the analytical
aspect of the bibliography needs to be approached with the knowledge of the authors' position on the coming of the war. 27
Goetzmann's well written history of American expansionism
from 1800 to 1860 follows Smith's interpretation closely and is intended to counter the "Whig-inspired apologetics" of the war.
This account, much more than the others of the Democratic conviction, examines the expansionist, even aggressive, nature of the
United States during this era. Goetzmann contends that Polk
mobilized United States military resources in order to negotiate
with Mexico from a position of strength and exhausted the route of
diplomatic negotiations. He did not, however, start the war. Far
from being the aggressor, the United States, argues the author,
"became the victim of Mexican internal strife."28
Montaigne's book is the least scholarly of the three discussed
here and it is more chauvinistic and anti-Mexican than Smith's
study. Montaigne considers his book a response "to a distortion of
this country's history, which together with other misinterpretations has· tarnished our image and misled millions of young
Americans into believing that America is among the most venal of
nations. "29
The proponents of the Democratic interpretation devote considerable attention to the political and military activities of Mexico on the eve of war. Indeed, Mexican motives and actions are
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more closely scrutinized than those of the Polk administration.
The Democratic interpretation, in contrast to the Whig view, is
that the Polk administration merely responded to Mexican initiatives.
A third and final group of studies present a more evenhanded
treatment of the coming of the war. They significantly improve
the quality of Mexican War historiography, primarily because
they have transcended the Whig-Democratic dialectic.
Frederick Merk in three books has reexamined certain aspects of
American expansionism of the 1840s. 30 Fruits of Propaganda and
Slavery and the Annexation of Texas begin to resuscitate the old
slavocracy thesis. Merk argues that southerners, in and out of
government, stressed the threat of British intervention in Texas to
northerners, and expansion of slavery and slave power in the national government to southerners, with regard to the proposed annexation of Texas. This intriguing interpretation raises the
possibility of intelligent public relations, not conspiracy, aiding
and even guiding public policy. In The Monroe Doctrine and
American Expansionism, Merk analyzes the changes in the
Monroe Doctrine during the administrations of Presidents Tyler
and Polk. Originally defensive, the doctrine came to be used in
support of territorial expansion in the name of national security.
Tyler and Polk, notes Merk, saw British attempts to encircle the
United States and apparently "imperilling its vital interests and its
principles of republicanism."31 In these three books Merk not only
clarifies some of the confusion of American expansionism and its
relation to the Mexican War but he also views Polk's Mexican
policy as a logical and important stage in the gradual evolution of
an emerging regional power.
Gene M. Brack's essay on the Mexican origins of the war fills an
important gap in Mexican War historiography. 32 Brack's purpose
is to explain why Mexico chose to fight rather than recognize the
independence of Texas or cede territory. He offers the first
substantial response to Justin Smith's conclusion that Mexicansconfident, bellicose, and hostile-wanted war. For this reason this
book is a most welcome addition to the literature of the Mexican
War.
Brack contends that Mexicans reacted more in fear than in aggressiveness. The annexation of Texas, the ideology of Manifest
Destiny, and American racism convinced many Mexicans that
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their national existence was at stake in the 1840s. This fear of the
United States and the hostility of the pro-war party placed the
Mexican government in a dangerous situation. Negotiation and
surrender of territory would insure a rebellion while refusal to
negotiate would bring on a war which most high officials did not
want, nor believed could be won. The Mexican government chose
war in response to the fear of national and cultural extinction and
political revolt. 33
The most important contribution to this historiography on the
Mexican side since Jose C. Valdes, Breve historia dela guerra con
los Estados Unidos written in 1947, is Jesus Velasco Marquez's
study of Mexican periodical opinion during the period 18451848. 34 Velasco Marquez's investigation of newspaper opinion
perfectly complements Brack's study of elites and their perceptions. Where Brack contends that Mexican leaders really did not
want war, Velasco Marquez shows that Mexican public opinion as
reflected in the small but influential Mexico City press, repeatedly
demanded war to resolve the Texas question from early 1845 until
the war began. Mexican periodistas rejected the alternative of
recognizing a free and independent Texas republic, thus blocking
the Herrera government's moderate policy toward Texas, for
several reasons. War with the United States was widely held to be
the "only means to preserve the Hispanic race and culture in Mexico. "35 It was also put forward that Mexico could not passively accept North American lawlessness without seriously compromising
the existence of an international order based on law. Mexican
liberals and conservatives considered war as not only indispensible internationally but also domestically useful. War would unite
the country and foment true nationalism and also create the
proper crisis environment for the execution of reforms. In short,
war was considered a magic formula for all of Mexico's international and domestic troubles. 36 Although Velasco Marquez contends that the war was, in the final analysis, the product of North
American expansionist zeal, he does not ignore Mexican responsibility. Pursuing his thesis that Mexican public opinion constantly
demanded war, he projects an image of an assertative nation with
more complex motives than simple reaction to American pressure.
The most recent and the best biography of James K. Polk is by
Charles Sellers. 37 Sellers is supportive of Polk's motives but he is
rather critical of Polk's Mexican policy. Sellers maintains that
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Polk's "sword-and-olive-branch diplomacy" was primarily designed to gain everything he wanted from Mexico-California and
a secure southwestern border-without war. Polk, according to
Sellers, truly expected the weak Mexican government to seek
peace according to these terms. However, if bullying and bribery
would not convince the Mexican government to submit to his territorial demands, Polk would not "shrink from war to accomplish
his purposes." When the Mexican government stubbornly refused
to receive Slidell, Polk saw no other alternative but to ask for
war. 38 Sellers devotes some attention to Polk's personality as it affected his diplomacy, a subject which has been largely neglected.
He notes that Polk's obsession with the martial Jackson image, his
contempt for Mexico and Mexicans, and his belief in American
virtue and superiority, significantly shaped the method and the
result of his foreign policy. 39
The books by K. Jack Bauer and David M. Pletcher are entirely
devoted to the Mexican War. 40 Bauer emphasizes the military side
of the conflict while Pletcher, in his diplomatic narrative, devotes
much more attention to the origins of the war than has any other
author. Both writers note their objectivity at the start by stating
that both sides in the conflict must bear responsibility for it. Both
sides made mistakes and misread the intentions of the other. Yet
these two authors cannot escape the central problem of culpability, and by implication and emphasis they come down on opposite
sides of the question.
Bauer leans toward the thesis of Mexican responsibility. He
stresses the importance of Mexican inability to settle American
claims, Polk's peaceful intentions and readiness to negotiate, and
Mexico's intransigence regarding the annexation of Texas. For
Bauer, Polk's well-intentioned and justified military and diplomatic pressure failed because Mexican sensibilities were too inflamed. The Polk administration, he notes however, did not
handle the crisis with Mexico as well as it could have since it did
not understand Mexico and the character of the Mexican people. 41
Pletcher is critical of Polk's diplomacy, policies neither tactful
nor adept but chauvinistic and costly to the tune of 12,800 deaths
and over $100 million in expenses. He notes that Polk "set forth on
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a foreign policy of strong stands, overstated arguments, and
menacing public pronouncements, not because he wanted war but
because he felt that this was the only language which his foreign
adversaries would understand. "42 It became progressively more
difficult for Polk to take a more conciliatory position. Therefore
the Mexican government was pushed into a corner. In the end,
Polk's bold and firm course toward Mexico backfired. In late
April, 1846, Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande and engaged
a detachment of American soldiers in a small fight. Mexico had
lashed back. 43 According to Pletcher, Polk did not seek war with
Mexico, but he was not adverse to using the threat of war, of even
a limited war itself, to accomplish his goals. He eschewed the
traditional diplomatic skill of appreciating "a foreign people's
hopes, fears, and driving impulses," notes Pletcher, for a policy of
bluff and show of force. 44 Pletcher's international focus, impressive research, and persuasive analysis has made his book the
best study of the coming of the war and the diplomacy of the
peace. Smith has been replaced by Pletcher as the current last
word on the coming of the UnitedStates war with Mexico.
The debate, however, is not over, as the proponents of the Whig
and the Democratic interpretations will readily admit. Nor have
all the research possibilities been exhausted. Mexican scholars
have only opened the door to (he study of the roles and opinions of
various Mexican groups with regard to the coming of the war.
Also, despite an increasing amount of impressive research on
society and politics in pre-war Mexico and Jacksonian America,
few authors of recent studies have considered the larger comparative framework of two vastly different cultures in their first
years of contact. Desire for a southern transcontinental railroad
route, as a motivation for American expansion, is a seriously
neglected subject, as is the topic of Polk's personality.45 The
Stockton affair is by no means settled. Aside from these larger
issues, the need for the investigation of limited topics, such as the
Santa Anna-Atocha scheme, is nearly unlimited.
The Mexican War, the "forgotten war" in American and Mexican history, is considered important primarily for its results
rather than its origins. This is not surprising since in the histories"
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of both countries this war was overshadowed by more momentous
subsequent events. For the United States the war has become, in
the words of Alfred H. Bill, a rehearsal for conflict. 46 The war
added the Mexican cession which pushed the issue of slavery and
its expansion onto the center stage of national politics. For Mexico, the war deprived the nation of one-half of its national territory
and the rich mineral and agricultural resources of this lost land.
Additionally, it provided the shock which led to the period in Mexican history called La Reforma. 47
The question of the origins of the war has less apparent relevance to later historical developments in the United States and
Mexico. Most authors writing on this subject have usually considered the problem of war causation as an isolated question of
justice: Who was the aggrieved and who was the aggressor? War
origins do, however, tell the historian more than this. Karl
Schmitt, for example, suggests that United States's political consensus before the war freed American energy, which gravitated
outwardly. Mexican energies, on the other hand, were focused
toward the center, at Mexico City, in order to protect conflicting
interests and advance contending ideologies. The situation of the
two countries on the eve of war, then, can be viewed not only in
terms of politics but also in the perspective of two societies with
very different concerns and interests. 48
Close examination of the diplomacy and politics of the origins of
the Mexican War is essential to the study of American expansionism, Mexican, and even Hispanic-American politics and national character. Such examinations, following a comparative
approach, could rid Americans of the notion that other peoples
simply react to American words and deeds. An examination of the
Mexican origins of the war uncovers fear, hatred, and admiration
toward the United States, a self perception of inferiority, and an
admirable stubbornness which did not disappear in 1848. In conclusion, behavior, concerns, illusions, and mistakes taken on the
road to war reveal many facets of a nation's evolving character.
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CALVIN HORN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP
CONTEST RULES
THE CALVIN HORN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIPS are available to New Mexico eleventh and
twelfth graders who have composed worthy essays concerning some aspect of New
Mexico's history. Four one-year full tuition scholarships are awarded each year to any New
Mexico state university.
Winners in the 1979 contest are Shirlene Stroup of Dora, attending Eastern New Mexico
State, Portales; Ellen Riser of St. Michael's, Santa Fe, also attending Eastern; Elaine
Murphy, a senior at Farmington High School; and John Fellin of Gallup, attending UNM.
Winning essays are "Culture Told by Ancient Indian Homes," by Stroup; "Saint Michael's
High School: A Beacon of Light," by Riser; "A Brief History of Navajo Dam," by Murphy;
and "The Role of C. N. Cotton in the Development of Northwestern New Mexico," by
Fellin.
The 1980 contest will offer the same rewards to winners. All entries should reach the judges
on or before April I, 1980. The following rules apply:
a. Students must be enrolled in an accredited New Mexico public or private high
school in the eleventh or twelfth grades during the school year 1979-1980.
b. Subject matter for the essay is not limited, except that it must pertain to the history
of New Mexico as defined by the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW (see inside
front cover).
c. The essay should not exceed 3,500 words, and should conform to the style of the
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. The essay should also include a bibliography.
d. The essay should reflect the student's own research into original sources, and
should expose new information or give a new viewpoint on previously considered
subjects. Resource material may include documentary evidence, oral interview, and
other generally accepted sources of historical data.
e. Entries postmarked no later than May 1, 1980, should be sent to Calvin Horn
Historical Scholarship Contest, NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, Mesa Vista
1013, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 87131.

f. Entries will be judged by members of the staff and editorial boards of the REVIEW
based on historical scholarship and quality of presentation. Winners will be announced before June I, 1980, and in a subsequent number of the NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW.
g. Scholarships must be used in the academic year following the winner's graduation
from high school.
More information may be obtained by calling the NMHR office, (505) 277-5839.

